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Abstract  
 
In this paper we describe a reliable and accurate steganalysis method for detecting covert Voice over IP 
(VoIP) communication channels. The proposed method utilises a unique sliding window mechanism and 
an improved RS algorithm for VoIP steganalysis, which detects the presence of Least Significant Bit (LSB) 
embedded VoIP streams. With the mechanism, the detection window moves forward one packet or several 
packets each time to screen VoIP streams. The optimum detection threshold for the proposed detection 
metric is computed by modelling the distributions of the new metric for stego and cover VoIP streams. 
Experimental analysis reveals the proposed method improves the detection time significantly, utilizing 
less memory resources for VoIP steganalysis, thereby enabling real-time detection of stego VoIP streams. 
The proposed method also provides a significant improvement on precision in detecting multiple covert 
VoIP channels when compared to the conventional RS method. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern steganography is the art of covert communication, which hides the existence of secret messages 
embedded in cover objects over the public channel. Steganography in static cover objects, such as 
plaintext, image files with BMP or JPEG format, and audio files in WAV or MP3 format, has been 
explored extensively [1-3]. See [4] for a good survey of such techniques. Recently network protocols 
and media streams like Voice over IP (VoIP) were used as cover objects to embed secret messages [5]. 
Dittmann et al, for example, reported the design and evaluation of steganography for VoIP [6], indicating 
possible threats as a result of embedding secret messages in such a widely used communication protocol. 
 
Steganalysis is the science of detecting messages hidden using steganography. The goal of steganalysis 
is to distinguish stego objects (objects containing a secret message) from cover objects with little or no 
knowledge of steganographic algorithms. The simplest method to detect steganographically-encoded 
packages/files is to compare them to known originals. Comparing the package against the original file 
will yield the differences caused by encoding the payload – and, thus, the payload can be extracted. 
Nowadays, steganalysis becomes increasingly important in computer forensics, for tracking and 
screening documents/audios/videos that are suspect of criminal and terrorism activities, and for 
information security to prevent leakage of unauthorized data. 
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There have been some attempts to develop the steganalysis techniques for detecting steganography in 
static cover objects such as text, image or audio files. A number of image and audio steganalysis 
methods have been reported in the literature [7-12]. In contrast with image and audio steganalysis, 
steganalysis in media streams (like VoIP) is largely unexplored so far. 
 
Several audio steganalysis approaches, such as the works of Ozer et al [13], Johnson et al [14], and Ru et 
al [15], shall be mentioned here as related work. These approaches can be placed in two groups. One is 
based on the distances computed between a real signal and a self-generated reference signal [15] via 
linear predictive coding (LPC), benefiting from the very nature of the continuous wave-based audio 
signals like G.711 PCM (Pulse-code Modulation). Ozer et al suggested a de-noising function for 
generating reference signals [13]. The other group relies on a statistical model for normal and 
‘abnormal’ behaviour. For example, Johnson et al [14] presented a statistical model that consists of 
errors in representing audio spectrograms using a linear basis. The linear basis was constructed from a 
principal component analysis (PCA) and the classification was conducted using a non-linear SVM 
(support vector machine). 
 
Voice over IP enables the digitalisation, compression and transmission of analogue audio signals from a 
sender to a receiver using IP packets. As the size of the used network and the distance between the 
communicating parties are of little relevance for transmission, VoIP is used for worldwide telephony 
such as Skype. With the upsurge of VoIP applications available for commercial use in recent years, 
VoIP is becoming one of the most interesting cover objects for steganography [5, 6, 16]. VoIP streams 
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are dynamic chunks of a series of packets that consist of IP headers, UDP headers, RTP headers, and 
numbers of audio frames. Those headers and frames have a number of unused fields, providing plausible 
covert channels and thus giving scope for steganography.   
 
Kraetzer and Dittmann’s work [17] is relevant to our work. They suggested a steganalysis method of 
detecting VoIP steganography based on Mel-Cepstrum, which is an excellent feature vector for 
representing the human voice and musical signals in the field of speech and speaker detection. In their 
work a feature based statistical model for the behaviour of the channel over time was computed and 
compared by χ2-testing against standard distributions. However, they assumed the detection probability 
of 52% was the lower boundary for discriminating features. So far there are still few steganalysis 
methods available for detecting VoIP steganography. This was the reason that led us to propose this 
work in the first place. 
 
Unlike image and audio steganalysis, VoIP steganalysis generally starts with a pile of suspect data 
streams (which is often quite large), but little information about which of the streams, if any, contain a 
secret message. There would appear to be two modes that can be used to determine whether a covert 
VoIP communication occurs. One is to perform an off-line steganalysis using an extremely powerful 
computer after all packets have been captured and stored in a buffer; the other is to conduct real-time 
detection of covert VoIP streams. The former has an obvious disadvantage because it needs a large buffer 
to store all streams. In this study we focus on the latter mode, i.e. seeking ways to detect stego VoIP 
streams among all the streams in a rapid and real-time manner.  
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Fridrich’s RS algorithm is regarded as an effective steganalysis method to detect Least Significant Bit 
(LSB) replacement steganography in colour and grayscale images [7]. Dumitrescu et al [8] suggested 
another steganalysis algorithm for LSB replacement embedding, Sample Pair Analysis (SPA). Both 
image steganalysis algorithms seem to follow the same methodology. Dumitrescu also claimed the 
algorithms are applicable to images, but also to other cover objects in principle. However, the 
effectiveness of the conventional RS algorithms for VoIP steganalysis is unknown, and this study is to 
address this issue. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 a sliding window based steganalysis method 
is proposed for detecting stego VoIP streams, including a steganalysis model for VoIP steganography, 
sliding window detection, VoIP steganalysis algorithms, and the optimum detection threshold. Section 3 
presents experimental results for performance evaluation, such as detection accuracy, detection window 
lengths, computational complexity and detection time. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a summary and 
directions for future work. 
 
 
2. SLIDING WINDOW BASED STEGANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Steganalysis Model for VoIP Steganography 
 
The ‘prisoner’ problem is a de facto model for a covert communication channel [18]. Prior work on 
steganography assumes Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver) share a private key or a public/private key pair 
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and a public function; this function takes the key and stego-object as inputs and outputs the secret 
message. Alice sends Bob a transmitted object which may either be a cover-object or a stego-object, and 
the adversary (Wendy) is free to examine all transmitted objects between Alice and Bob and must decide 
whether such transmissions include a hidden message. 
 
Figure 1 shows a steganalysis model for VoIP steganography on the Internet, in which Alice and Bob use 
VoIP software to communicate secretly, so the VoIP stream transmitted between them contains a secret 
message, and such a stego VoIP stream is denoted by si. Other users like John and Smith use the 
software for normal communications where VoIP streams do not contain any secret message, and they 
are denoted by s1, s2, … si-1, si+1, … sj. As a warden, Wendy monitors the router connected with the 
network so as to detect the stego VoIP stream, si, from all streams, S = {s1, s2, … si, … sj, …}. Assuming 
the stego stream, si, is composed of Ni packets, then  1 2, ,..., iNi i i is p p p , where jip is the jth RTP 
packet in the stream. 
 
In the steganalysis model for VoIP steganography, Wendy captures all the streams passing through the 
router, identifies VoIP streams among all the streams, and then distinguishes stego VoIP streams from 
‘innocent’ VoIP streams. As Wendy’s task is time-consuming, rapid and near ‘real-time’ detection of 
stego VoIP streams should be considered in order to make the detection process more practicable. 
 
For simplicity, Wendy’s task is assumed to make a decision on two choices for each VoIP stream. One 
choice is the null hypothesis H0, i.e. no steganography happens. The other choice is the alternative 
hypothesis H1, i.e. steganography occurs. In general, VoIP streams contain no hidden messages, so the 
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non-existence of steganography is regarded as the conservative hypothesis which requires evidence to 
reject. 
 
2.2 Sliding Window Detection 
 
To achieve real-time detection of VoIP steganography, it needs to rapidly select packets from VoIP 
streams for steganalysis. In a real-time mode, steganalysis may be conducted against only part of 
packets in a VoIP stream rather than the entire stream, as the processed packets in the stream are 
discarded when successive packets arrive. Based on this idea, we propose a steganalysis method using 
sliding windows to improve the detection performance of stego VoIP streams. The definitions below 
introduce the sliding window method for VoIP steganalysis. 
 
Definition 1, the detection window, W, is a set of packets that are sampled for detecting the secret 
message hidden in a VoIP stream. 
 
Definition 2, the detection window length, L, represents the number of packets that the detection 
window contains. 
 
For a stream si, if the last received packet is kip , the current detection window is denoted by 
 
 
1 2 1
1 2 1
, ,..., , ,
, ,..., , ,
k L k L k k
i i i i
k k
i i i i
p p p p k L
p p p p k L
    

  
 
When the next packet 1kip
 arrives, the detection window slides forward one packet. In the perspective of 
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temporal dimension, the detection window moves forward one packet each time, and the new detection 
window is denoted by 
 
 
2 3 1
1 2 1
, ,..., , ,
, ,..., , ,
k L k L k k
i i i i
k k
i i i i
p p p p k L
p p p p k L
    

  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the sliding process of the detection window. 
 
With the sliding window method, only part of packets in a VoIP stream needs to be buffered while the 
stream is being screened, thus the required buffer/storage size can be minimised. Another advantage of 
the method is that the detection time can be reduced significantly to an extent that rapid detection of 
stego VoIP streams would become possible. So the sliding window method would meet the requirement 
of real-time detection of VoIP steganography. 
 
Another possible detection method is based on stream segmentation, in which the detection window 
slides forward L packets rather than one packet once as described above. The basic idea of the stream 
segmentation method is to divide a VoIP stream into multiple segments with each segment containing L 
packets, and detect the presence of the secret message by screening each segment. 
 
The next step is to determine the minimum lengths of sliding windows at different levels of data 
embedding. The minimum sliding window length can be modelled by 
  ])~[(min)~( 2PPEPf LL      (1) 
where E represents the mean error, P is the practical (real) embedding rate in case of continuously 
embedding secret messages, and LP
~
 is the estimated embedding rate when the sliding window length is 
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more than L (numbers of packets). 
 
2.3 VoIP Steganalysis Algorithms 
 
The conventional RS algorithm for image steganalysis defines regular pixels (R) and singular pixels (S) 
in a cover image using the discrimination function and the flipping operation [7]. Flipping is a 
permutation of gray levels that entirely consists of 2-cycles. The principle of the RS steganalysis method 
is to estimate the four curves of the RS diagram and calculate their intersection using extrapolation. The 
general shape of the four curves varies with the cover image from almost perfectly linear to curved. 
 
In VoIP steganography, the unused header fields are used to embed secret messages. By adopting an 
approach similar to the conventional RS algorithm for image steganalysis, we define regular header 
fields (R) and singular header fields (S) in VoIP streams. According to the operational rules detailed in 
[7], RS algorithm defines eight parameters, i.e. Rp1, Rn1, Sp1, Sn1 and Rp2, Rn2, Sp2, Sn2, which are 
the intersecting points of the four curves (R+, R-, S+, S-) of the RS diagram. All the parameters are 
calculated to decide whether there is an embedded message, and to estimate the embedding rate. The 
parameters of the curves are then determined from the points marked in Figure 3. The x-axis is the 
percentage of header fields with flipped LSBs; the y-axis is the relative number of regular and singular 
groups (header fields). 
 
Let z be the non-embedding point after coordinate transformation, and it can be calculated using the 
following equation [7] 
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    01113221212 2  dndpzdpdpdndnzdpdp     (2) 
where dp1 = Rp1 - Sp1, dn1 = Rn1 - Sn1, dp2 = Rp2 – Sp2, and dn2 = Rn2 – Sn2. And the embedding 
rate p is given by 
 0.5p
z
z
              (3) 
Let th1 be the optimum detection threshold for the conventional RS algorithm. If P < th1, it means the 
cover object contains no secret messages; otherwise, there is a secret message embedded in the cover 
object. 
 
For VoIP steganalysis, one of the major problems is how to reduce the detection time so as to achieve 
real-time detection of stego VoIP steams. So the conventional RS algorithm needs to be modified to 
reduce computational complexity, utilising less memory resources, and make the algorithm applicable to 
VoIP steganalysis in a real-time manner. 
 
The main purpose of VoIP steganalysis is to determine whether VoIP streams contain secret messages. 
Analysis of the curves of the RS diagram (Figure 3) reveals stego VoIP streams were already different 
from the original ‘innocent’ VoIP streams after Rp1 and Rn1 had been calculated. This means only Rp1 
and Rn1 should be used for detection purposes, and thus, we suggest the normalized difference between 
Rp1 and Rn1, a statistical parameter, to be the embedding rate (the secret message length divided by the 
stego VoIP stream length), which is given by 
  
11
11
RpRn
RpRn
r 
               (4) 
Let VT be the optimum detection threshold for the VoIP steganalysis method. If r < VT, there are no 
  11
hidden messages; otherwise, VoIP streams contain secret messages.  
 
Comparing equations (3) and (4) indicates the improved RS algorithm has less computational 
complexity than the conventional RS algorithm. This would help improve the performance of detection 
of VoIP steganography. 
 
2.4 Optimum Detection Threshold 
 
The optimum detection threshold for the above VoIP steganalysis method (VT) is computed by modelling 
the distributions of stego and cover VoIP streams. The proposed mathematical model below requires 
some empirical data. 
 
Let C be the mean loss value due to false detection, C1 the loss of false positive (false alarm), and C2 the 
loss of false negative (detection failure). P(s1) denotes the probability of VoIP streams not containing 
secret messages, and P(s2) denotes the probability that secret messages are embedded in VoIP streams. 
P1(y) and P2(y) are the probability density functions (pdf) of VoIP streams not containing secret 
messages and those containing secret messages, respectively; they are likelihood functions. The mean 
loss C is then given by 
       222111 || sePsPCsePsPCC       (5) 
where    dyypseP TV  11| ,    dyypseP TV 22| , and they denote the probability of false 
positive (false alarm) and the probability of false negative (detection failure), respectively. 
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Assuming the mean loss is the minimum value, then 0

TV
C
. Equation (5) becomes 
       TT VpsPCVpsPC 222111            (6) 
According to the central limit theorem, the likelihood functions, P1(y) and P2(y), should conform to 
Gaussian distributions. Their mean values and mean square deviations can be computed by using 
samples’ mean values and mean square deviations. Let the mean values of P1(y) and P2(y) be 1 and 2, 
and the mean square deviations of P1(y) and P2(y) be 1 and 2, respectively. The probability density 
functions are given by 
    

  2
1
2
1
2
1
1 2
exp
2
1



yyp         (7) 
    

  2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
exp
2
1



yyp         (8) 
Substituting equations (7) and (8) into equation (6) obtains 
     
  222
111
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1 ln
22 





sPC
sPCVV TT       (9) 
Assuming 1  2, and using  to represent 1 and 2, the optimum detection threshold, VT, is then 
given by 
 
 
2
1 11 2
2 1 2 2
ln
2T
C P s
V
C P s
  
 
            (10) 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1 Experimental Setup 
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Figure 4 shows a framework for sliding window based VoIP steganalysis. The steganalysis software 
consists of three modules, an IP packet capturer, a VoIP stream identifier, and a sliding window detector. 
 
The packet capturer was used to collect all IP packets passing through the router and match streams with 
packets. The VoIP stream identifier was employed to identify VoIP streams among all streams. The 
sliding window detector was utilised to detect the existence of the secret message embedded in the 
packets of VoIP streams. Three modules were implemented on the Server with an Intel Xeon 3065 CPU, 
2GB memory, and a 1000MB Ethernet interface card. 
 
In the experiments, ten users in our laboratory employed Stego-Talk software to communicate securely 
with their counterparts at other universities over China Education and Research Network (CERNET). 
The VoIP steganalysis software was connected to the router that forwards packets between a LAN in the 
laboratory and the CERNET. We used G.711 speech codec and LSB steganography algorithms to embed 
secret messages in PCM audio payload at various embedding rates ranging from 0% to 100% in 5 
percent increments. Experimental results are discussed in detail below. 
 
3.2 Comparisons between Detection Methods 
 
Comparisons in detection performance between three detection methods, Sliding window, Segmentation, 
and Entire stream (only one segment), were conducted and the results are shown in Figure 5. The x-axis 
is the length of the secret message continually embedded in VoIP streams. The experiments indicate that 
all the methods could not detect the existence of the hidden message when the secret message length 
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was less than 1 second. As the secret message length increased up to 2 seconds, the sliding window 
method detected the existence of the hidden message. The segmentation method could not detect the 
hidden message until the secret message length was more than 4 seconds. The entire stream method 
could not detect the hidden message at all. 
 
Analysis of the experimental results reveals the sliding window method is more accurate than the 
segmentation method in case of fewer packets containing secret messages. For example, if the length of 
the VoIP stream used to embed a message was less than 2 seconds at a 100% embedding rate, the 
segmentation method would not be able to detect the existence of the hidden message. The 
non-effectiveness of the segmentation method is probably due to the fact that the VoIP stream containing 
a secret message needs to be divided into at least two segments, so steganalysis of each segment would 
be less effective because of less hidden information. 
 
To compare detection accuracy, the sliding window method and the segmentation method were used, 
respectively, to detect VoIP steganography in which secret messages were embedded in VoIP streams at a 
20 percent embedding rate. The detection window length was 300 packets, and the segmentation length 
was also 300 packets. The improved RS algorithm was adopted in the experiments, and the detection 
threshold was set to 0.04. Figure 6 shows comparisons in detection precision between the sliding 
window method (top figure) and the segmentation method (bottom figure). 
 
The experiments indicate that only the sliding window method could correctly detect the existence of 
hidden messages under the experimental conditions. The segmentation method failed to detect stego 
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VoIP streams because it needs a larger embedding message length threshold when compared to the 
sliding window method. So the sliding window method was chosen for the remaining experiments. 
 
3.3 Lengths of Sliding Windows 
 
To obtain the empirical length of sliding windows, a series of experiments were conducted to determine 
the minimum lengths of sliding windows at various embedding rates ranging from 5% to 100% in 5 
percent increments, and the results are shown in Figure 7. Clearly the minimum length of sliding 
windows capable of detecting the existence of hidden messages decreased gradually with increasing 
embedding rate. 
 
The relationship between detection accuracy and the length of sliding windows was used to determine 
the minimum length of sliding windows with reasonable detection accuracy. Practical false alarm rates 
and true detection rates [19] were measured at various lengths of sliding windows at 20% embedding 
rate, and the results are shown in Figure 8. Detection accuracy improved with an increase in sliding 
window lengths at the same false alarm rate, but computational complexity also increased 
correspondingly. Analysis of Figure 8 reveals the length of sliding windows should be approximately 
300 packets in order to achieve 95% true detection with 5% false alarm. 
 
3.4 Optimum Detection Threshold 
 
As the likelihood function, P2(y), varies with the embedding rate, experiments were designated in this 
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study to establish the relationship between the embedding rate and the likelihood function. In the 
experiments, the embedding rate was set to 5%, the length of detection windows was 300 packets (each 
packet with a length of 160ms), and the results are shown in Figure 9. The results were then used to 
obtain the probability density functions for the VoIP streams not containing secret messages and those 
containing secret messages with 5% LSB being replaced, respectively. 
 
In addition, the mean square deviation of the likelihood function has an impact on the performance of 
VoIP steganalysis. Figure 10 shows the mean square deviation of the likelihood function decreased as 
the detection window length increased. 
 
Therefore, equation (10) and experimental data in Figures 9 and 10 enable ones to determine the 
optimum detection threshold at different levels of data embedding. 
 
3.5 Improved RS Algorithm vs. Conventional RS Algorithm 
 
To examine whether or not the improved RS algorithm would affect detection accuracy, a series of 
experiments were conducted by using the sliding window detection method with the improved RS 
algorithm or the conventional RS algorithm under the same experimental conditions.  
 
The detection window lengths in the experiments were set to be 200, 250 and 300 packets in a G.711 
codec, respectively; and the embedding rates were kept at 20%. The conventional RS algorithm and the 
improved RS algorithm were applied to the same detection window lengths. Both algorithms were 
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compared in terms of detection performance, computational complexity and memory resources. 
 
Figure 11 shows comparisons in detection accuracy between the improved RS algorithm using r and the 
conventional RS algorithm using p. The ROC curves for the algorithms show both steganalysis 
algorithms achieved similar detection accuracy. The experimental results indicate there were no obvious 
discrepancies in detection accuracy between using r (the improved RS algorithm) and P (the 
conventional RS algorithm) as the optimum detection threshold. 
 
In view of computational time, both the improved and conventional RS algorithms are o(n) degree since 
their computational complexity has a linear relation to the length of sampled stream data. Table 1 lists 
computational complexity and the detection time in ms for the improved and conventional RS 
algorithms. The results indicate both algorithms made correct judgments; however, the improved RS 
algorithm reduced the detection time from 292 ms to 105 ms, achieving up to 64% performance 
improvement over the conventional RS method, when encrypted secret messages were embedded in 
VoIP streams at 20% embedding rate. 
 
Table 1  Comparisons in Detection Time 
Length of cover objects (bytes)
Mean detection time (ms) 
Improved RS 
algorithm 
Conventional RS 
algorithm 
46,560 (no embedding) 62 172 
78,960 (20% embedding) 105 292 
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The improvement in detection time is due to the fact that the sliding window detection method using the 
improved RS algorithm avoids flipping all the data under the detection window, and it reduces the 
number of the parameters required to be calculated in Figure 3 from 8 to 2. So the size of the required 
buffer would be reduced by 50% when compared to the conventional RS method. 
 
3.6 Multiple Covert VoIP Channels 
 
The previous sections (3.2-3.5) detail experimental results for a single covert VoIP communication 
channel, i.e. only one secret message was embedded in VoIP streams each time. This section deals with 
multiple covert VoIP communication channels where various secret messages were embedded in 
different covert channels simultaneously. 
 
The sliding window method using the improved or conventional RS algorithms was used to 
simultaneously detect multiple covert VoIP channels from all the streams passing through the router. 
Each covert channel contained a secrete message embedded in VoIP streams; different secrete messages 
were hidden in different covert VoIP channels. The detection precision of the sliding window method 
depends on a number of factors such as the detection window length, the used RS algorithm and the 
number of covert VoIP channels. 
 
Figure 12 shows the detection percentage varied depending on the number of covert VoIP channels at 
20% embedding rate. The results indicate the detection percentage decreased gradually as the number of 
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covert VoIP channels increased. The detection accuracy of the conventional RS method reduced 
dramatically with increasing covert VoIP channels; the detection percentage was only 25% when there 
were eight covert VoIP channels. However, the sliding widow method using the improved RS algorithm 
achieved 100 percent detection until the number of covert VoIP channels reached five (i.e. five secret 
messages were embedded in five different covert channels simultaneously); this new method still 
attained over 65 percent of detection even there were eight covert VoIP channels. The experiments 
indicate that the proposed sliding window method provide a significant improvement on precision in 
detecting multiple covert VoIP channels when compared to the conventional RS method.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have suggested a new approach to detecting covert channels in VoIP communications. 
Our proposed sliding window steganalysis method provides a 64 percent improvement on the detection 
time over the conventional RS method, thereby enabling rapid and real-time detection of stego VoIP 
streams. The proposed method has been proved to be suitable for detecting covert VoIP communications. 
 
Experimental results have shown that the proposed sliding window method using an improved RS 
algorithm can correctly and simultaneously detect up to five covert VoIP channels with 100 percent 
detection accuracy. At this stage, the optimum detection window length is determined by modelling 
empirical data. Building a mathematical model for depicting the relationship between detection accuracy, 
efficiency and the detection window length is the subject of future work. 
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Fig. 1.  A steganalysis model for VoIP steganography 
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Fig. 2. The sliding process of the detection window 
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Fig. 3.  RS-diagram of VoIP streams 
 
  
 
26
 
Capturer VoIP
Stream
Identifier
Sliding
Window
Detector
NIC
Sniffer
Rule
Database
Stego VoIP
Streams
Network
Administrator
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  The framework for sliding window based VoIP steganalysis 
 
  
 
27
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Secret message length (Seconds)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
e
m
b
e
d
d
i
n
g
 
r
a
t
e
Entire stream
Segmentation
Sliding window
Threshold
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparisons in performance between three detection methods 
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Fig. 6. Comparisons between the sliding window method (top figure) and the segmentation method (bottom figure) 
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Fig. 7. The length of sliding windows vs. the embedding rate 
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Fig. 8.  ROC curves for various sliding window lengths at 20% embedding rate 
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Fig. 9. The probability density functions 
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Fig. 10.  The mean square deviation vs. the detection window length 
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Fig. 11. ROC curves for the algorithms using r and p 
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Fig. 12. Detection percentage vs. the number of covert VoIP channels 
